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1 Introduction
Segregation is a pervasive social issue. The segregation of men and women into diﬀerent
occupations helps explain the gender gap in earnings.1 Racial segregation in schools is
thought to contribute to low educational achievement among minorities.2 Residential seg-
regation has been blamed for black poverty, high black mortality, and increases in prejudice
among whites.3 In other contexts, segregation is viewed more positively. The formation
of homogeneous living areas has been discussed as a solution to highly polarized conflicts in
the Middle East, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere.
The literature on segregation measurement has generated over 20 diﬀerent indices (see
Massey and Denton [37] and Flückiger and Silber [20]). While some papers have analyzed
the properties of various indices, very few of them have provided a full characterization,
and none of these have used purely ordinal axioms. Further, the existing characterizations
treat only the two-group case. In this paper we provide a full ordinal characterization of a
segregation index for the multigroup case.
Axiomatizations are important because they characterize an index in terms of basic
properties and thus facilitate the comparison of diﬀerent measures. Ordinal axioms are more
appealing than cardinal ones because they refer to bilateral comparisons and not to their
specific functional representations. Multigroup segregation orderings are important because
they allow us to study units (cities, school districts, etc.) with more than two ethnic groups
and to compare units with diﬀerent numbers of groups.
In this paper we focus on contexts in which geography is unimportant. In some cases,
such as residential neighborhoods, this might be a strong assumption. In others, it is more
innocuous. For instance, the presence of other schools near a given student’s school typically
does not have a great eﬀect on the student’s educational outcomes. Hence, our presentation
will focus on school district segregation.
1See Cotter et al [14], Lewis [34], and Macpherson and Hirsh [36].
2Recent studies include Boozer, Krueger, and Wolkon [3] and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin [25].
3See Cutler and Glaeser [16], Collins and Williams [12], and Kinder and Mendelberg [33], respectively.
2
Formally, we define a segregation ordering as an ordering on school districts: a ranking
from most segregated to least segregated. We propose a set of axioms that, we argue, such
an ordering should satisfy. We then prove that there is a unique ordering that satisfies
our axioms. It is represented by a simple index: the total entropy of the school district,
minus the within-school entropy. We call this the “Mutual Information” index. It can
be interpreted as the average amount of information a student’s school reveals about her
ethnicity.
The Mutual Information index was first proposed by Theil [52, p. 653] and was applied
by Fuchs [23] and Mora and Ruiz-Castillo [38, 41] to study gender segregation in the labor
force.4 It is related to the more widely used Entropy index (Theil [53]; Theil and Finizza
[54]), which equals one minus the ratio of within-school entropy to total entropy. While
the Entropy index is normalized to reach a maximum value of one, the Mutual Information
index has no maximum value. However, the Entropy index violates two of our axioms.
In order to judge our axioms, one must have an idea of what we are trying to measure.
A starting point is James and Taeuber’s [32] definition of segregation as the tendency of
ethnic groups to have diﬀerent distributions across locational units such as schools or neigh-
borhoods. In a later paper, Massey and Denton [37] discern five diﬀerent dimensions of
segregation. The first, evenness, agrees with James and Taeuber’s definition. The sec-
ond dimension is isolation from the majority group. The three other dimensions rely on
geographic information and thus are not relevant to our study.5
While evenness generalizes easily to the multigroup setting, isolation is more of a chal-
lenge, since there is more than one other ethnic group from which a student can be “isolated.”
Hence, we replace isolation with the related concept of representativeness: to what extent do
students attend schools that have diﬀerent ethnic compositions than the district as a whole?
The concepts are related, since racially isolated schools are, by definition, not representative
4See also Herranz, Mora, and Ruiz-Castillo [26]. Some of the properties of the Mutual Information index
have been previously noted by Mora and Ruiz-Castillo in the case of two ethnic groups [39, 40].
5These dimensions are concentration in a small area, centralization in the urban core, and clustering in
a contiguous enclave.
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of their districts. But unlike isolation, representativeness is not based on exposure to just
one other group.
The concept of representativeness is connected to economic issues such as equality of op-
portunity. Boozer, Krueger, and Wolkin [3] and Hoxby [27] find that the ethnic composition
of a school aﬀects individual students’ achievement. In the presence of such ethnic-based
peer eﬀects, a lack of representativeness can create unequal educational opportunities among
students of diﬀerent races. Evidence for this appears in Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin [25],
who find that the higher proportion of blacks in the school attended by the typical black
student can explain a large portion of the black-white wage gap.
Representativeness and evenness are dual concepts. In Table 1 we depict a school
district as a matrix, where the rows are ethnic groups, the columns are schools, and the cells
contain numbers of students. A deviation from evenness (representativeness) corresponds
to diﬀerences in the row (column) percentages. The Mutual Information index treats these
deviations symmetrically: if the matrix is transposed, the Mutual Information of the district
is unchanged. This property is a result of our axiomatization rather than an assumption.
District X
School A School B
Blacks 500 200
Whites 100 400
Table 1: Matrix representation of a district.
We study segregation with respect to a particular choice of locations (schools, classrooms,
etc.). The segregation ranking of a district is sensitive to this choice. However, one can
study segregation at several nested levels at once by exploiting the additive decomposability
of the Mutual Information index: segregation between the classrooms of a district equals
segregation between the district’s schools plus the population-weighted mean level of segre-
gation within the schools (Mora and Ruiz-Castillo [39]). This property is not satisfied by
the other common segregation indices.
We also study segregation with respect to a particular ethnic schema. Sensitivity to
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the choice of ethnic schema is a property of any nontrivial segregation measure.6 However,
the Mutual Information index is also decomposable with respect to ethnic groups. For
instance, if students are classified by both race and language spoken at home, then total
segregation equals segregation by race plus the population-weighted mean level of segregation
by language within the racial groups. This property can be used to study segregation with
several nested ethnic schemas simultaneously and is not satisfied by other common indices.
In our analysis, we will assume that each ethnic group can be distributed in arbitrary
real proportions across the schools in a district. This assumption ensures, by appropriately
distributing students, that all schools can be representative of the district, i.e., be small copies
of it. It is a good approximation when the ethnic groups have many more members than
there are schools in the district and when capacity constraints on schools are not binding.
It would not be suitable, for instance, if there were three equal-size ethnic groups and a
maximum capacity of two students per school; or if there were an ethnic group with two
members to be allocated among three schools. These are not the intended applications of
our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Notation is introduced in section 2. In
section 3 we explain our axioms. The main result appears in section 4. In section 5,
we survey other multigroup segregation indices and consider three other properties that an
index might satisfy. We survey related literature in section 6. Proofs are collected in an
appendix.
2 Notation
Formally, we define a (school) district as follows:
Definition 1 A district X consists of
6Consider a district with two schools, one with 50 Hispanic whites and the other with 50 Anglo whites.
Ignoring Hispanic origin, the district is completely integrated; taking it into account, the district is completely
segregated.
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• A nonempty and finite set of ethnic groups G(X)
• A nonempty and finite set of schools N(X)
• For each ethnic group g ∈ G(X) and for each school n ∈ N(X), a nonnegative number
Tng : the number of members of ethnic group g that attend school n.
For instance, in the districtX depicted in Table 1,G(X) = {Black ,White},N(X) = {A,B},
TABlack = 500, and so on. The district in Table 1 is depicted in matrix format. We will
also sometimes specify a district in list format:
­
(Tng )g∈G
®
n∈N. For instance, h(1, 2) , (3, 1)i
denotes a district with two ethnic groups (e.g., blacks and whites) and two schools. The first
school, (1, 2), contains one black and two whites; the second, (3, 1), contains three blacks
and one white. For any two districts X and Y , X ] Y denotes the result of combining
the schools in X and the schools in Y into a single district.7 If X is a district and α
is a nonnegative scalar, then αX denotes the district in which the number of students in
each group and school has been multiplied by α; for instance, if X = h(1, 2) , (3, 1)i, then
2X = h(2, 4) , (6, 2)i. Also, c(X) denotes the district that results from combining the schools
in X into a single school.
7Formally, X ] Y denotes the district ­(Tng )g∈G
®
n∈N, where G = G(X) ∪ G(Y ) is the set of ethnic
groups that are present in either district and N =N(X)∪N(Y ) is the set of all schools in the two districts.
Naturally, if an ethnic group g is present only in one district, then Tng , the number of members of group g
in school n, equals zero for all schools n in the other district.
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The following notation will be useful:
Tg =
X
n∈N
T ng : the number of students in ethnic group g in the district
T n =
X
g∈G
Tng : the total number of students who attend school n
T =
X
g∈G
Tg: the total number of students in the district
Pg =
Tg
T
: the proportion of students in the district who are in ethnic group g
P n =
Tn
T
: the proportion of students in the district who are in school n
png =
Tng
Tn
(for Tn > 0): the proportion of students in school n who are in ethnic group g
The group distribution of a district X is the vector (Pg)g∈G of proportions of the students
in the district who are in each ethnic group. The group distribution of a nonempty school n
is the vector
¡
png
¢
g∈G of proportions of students in school n who are in each ethnic group.
A school is representative if it has the same group distribution as the district that contains
it.
3 Axioms
Let C be the set of all districts. A segregation ordering < is a complete and transitive binary
relation on C. We interpret X < Y to mean “district X is at least as segregated as district
Y.” The relations ∼ and Â are derived from < in the usual way.8 A related concept is the
segregation index : a function S : C → R. The index S represents the segregation ordering
< if, for any two districts X,Y ∈ C,
X < Y ⇐⇒ S(X) ≥ S(Y ) (1)
8That is X ∼ Y if both X < Y and Y < X; X Â Y if X < Y but not Y < X.
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Every index S induces a segregation ordering that is defined by (1).
We impose axioms not on the segregation index but on the underlying segregation or-
dering. These approaches are not equivalent. As in utility theory, a segregation ordering
may be represented by more than one index, and there are segregation orderings that are
not captured by any index.
A district’s segregation ranking or simply its segregation is its place in the segregation
ordering. We will sometimes say that if a transformation σ : C → C is applied to a district
X, then “the segregation of the district is unchanged” or “the district’s segregation ranking
is unaﬀected.” By this we mean that σ(X) ∼ X. If this holds for all districts X, then we
will say that the segregation in a district is invariant to the transformation σ.
Evenness and representativeness are properties of the row and column percentages of the
district matrix. Nothing in these concepts suggests that the rows or columns should be
treated asymmetrically. Accordingly, our first axiom states that the order of the schools or
groups and their labels such as “black”, “Roosevelt School,” etc., do not matter: all that
matters is the number of each group who attend each school.
Symmetry (SYM) The segregation in a district is invariant to any relabeling or reordering
of the groups or the schools in the district.
One type of research for which this axiom may not be suitable is work that focuses on the
problems that face a particular ethnic group. For instance, if one is interested in the social
isolation of blacks from all other groups, then one may want to treat blacks diﬀerently (see,
e.g., Echenique and Fryer [18]).
The criteria of evenness and representativeness pertain to the row and column percentages
in the district matrix. Multiplying the whole matrix by a scalar does not aﬀect these
percentages, so it should not aﬀect the segregation ranking of a district. Hence, we assume
the following axiom.
Weak Scale Invariance (WSI) The segregation ranking of a district is unchanged if the
numbers of agents in all ethnic groups in all schools are multiplied by the same positive
scalar: for any district X ∈ C and any positive scalar α, X ∼ αX.
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This axiom implies that the districts X = h(106, 0) , (0, 106)i and Y = h(100, 0) , (0, 100)i
are equally segregated. One may argue that X is more segregated than Y because X is less
likely to be the outcome of random assignment of students to schools (see, e.g., Cortese, Falk,
and Cohen [13]). However, an important motivation for this paper is to produce a measure
that can be used to study the eﬀects of segregated schools on their students. In this context,
realized segregation would appear to be the appropriate concept.9 For researchers who desire
a test of random assignment, Mora and Ruiz-Castillo [40] show that a transformation of the
Mutual Information index can be used for this purpose.
We motivate the next three axioms with a brief discussion of the concepts of within-
cluster and between-cluster segregation. Suppose we partition a district into K clusters, C1
through CK, each consisting of a subset of schools in the district. Define segregation within
a given cluster as the segregation ranking of the cluster viewed in isolation, as a distinct
school district. Define segregation between the K clusters as the segregation ranking of a
district with K schools k = 1, ...,K, where school k consists of the students in cluster k in
the original district. We would like the district’s segregation ranking to be a function of
segregation within each cluster, segregation between the clusters, and the relative sizes of
the diﬀerent clusters. Naturally, a district’s segregation ranking should be a nondecreasing
function of both segregation within each cluster and segregation between the K clusters.
The first axiom that uses this principle is illustrated in Figure 1. In panel a, we divide a
district into two clusters. The first, cluster C1, consists of all schools except a single school
n. The second, cluster C2, consists of school n alone. In panel b, school n has been torn
down and replaced by two new schools, n1 and n2. Each student who formerly attended
school n now attends either school n1 or n2; all other students attend the same schools as
before.
This change should not lower segregation in the district. Why? The only factor aﬀected
by the split is segregation within cluster C2. There has been no change in segregation within
cluster C1, segregation between the clusters, or the relative sizes of the two clusters. Since
9For a colorful defense of realized segregation measures, see Taeuber and Taeuber [51, p. 886]
9
Figure 1: The School Division Property. In panel a, a district has been partitioned into two
clusters, one containing a single school n. In panel b, school n has been divided into schools n1
and n2. The School Division Property states that segregation is no lower in panel b than in panel
a and, moreover, that segregation is the same in the two panels if schools n1 and n2 have the same
ethnic distribution.
initially cluster C2 was not segregated at all, splitting school n cannot lower segregation in
this cluster. Accordingly, splitting school n should not lower segregation in the district either.
If schools n1 and n2 have the same ethnic distribution, then cluster C2 is not segregated at all
after the split, since each school is representative of the cluster. In this case, the segregation
ranking of the district should not change. These conclusions are formalized in the following
axiom.
School Division Property (SDP) Let X ∈ C be a district in which the set of schools is
N. Let X 0 be the result of splitting some school n ∈ N into two schools, n1 and n2.
Then X 0 < X. If both schools have the same ethnic distribution, then X 0 ∼ X.
The School Division Property is related to two properties that are discussed by James
and Taeuber [32] and subsequent authors. The first is organizational equivalence: if a school
is divided into two schools that have the same group distribution, the district’s level of
segregation does not change. The second is the transfer principle. When there are two
demographic groups, the transfer principle states that if a black (white) student moves
from one school to another school in which the proportion of blacks (whites) is higher,
then segregation in the district rises. In the case of two ethnic groups, SDP follows from
10
Figure 2: Type I Independence (IND1). Panel a shows two districts, X and Y , that have the
same size and ethnic distribution. IND1 states that adjoining the same cluster containing a single
school to the two districts (panel b) does not aﬀect which district is more segregated.
organizational equivalence and the transfer principle.10 But while SDP applies directly with
any number of groups, it is unclear what form the transfer principle should take with more
than two groups.11
Our next axiom is illustrated in Figure 2. In panel a, two districts, X and Y , are being
compared. The districts are assumed to have the same number of students and ethnic
distribution. In panel b, a cluster that contains a single school has been adjoined to each
of these districts. The axiom states that the addition of this cluster should not aﬀect
which district is more segregated. That is, the district on the left hand side in panel b is
more segregated than the district on the right hand side in panel b if and only if X is more
segregated than Y .
Type I Independence (IND1) Let X,Y ∈ C be two districts with equal populations and
equal group distributions. Then for any district Z that contains a single school, X
< Y if and only if X ] Z < Y ] Z.
10Proof available on request.
11For instance, suppose a black student moves to a school that has higher proportions of both blacks and
Asians but fewer whites. Since there are more blacks, one might argue (using the transfer principle) that
segregation has gone up. On the other hand, blacks are now more integrated with Asians. One attempt to
overcome this diﬃculty appears in Reardon and Firebaugh [45].
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Figure 3: In panel a, a given district, Z, is combined with each of two districts, X and Y , which
have the same total number of students but possibly diﬀerent ethnic distributions. In panel b, all
the schools in Z have been combined into a single school. Type II Independence states that this
merger does not aﬀect which combined district is more segregated.
For an intuition, we once again rely on the concepts of within-cluster and between-cluster
segregation, where the clusters are nowX, Y , and Z. Since X and Y have the same size and
group distribution, in each combined district in panel b the between-cluster segregation is
the same. Moreover, segregation within cluster Z is the same in the two combined districts.
Hence, which of the combined districts in panel b is more segregated reduces to whether
segregation within cluster X is greater than segregation within cluster Y .
A second type of independence is depicted in Figure 3. In panel a, a given district, Z,
is paired with each of two districts, X and Y . As in Figure 2, X and Y have the same total
number of students; unlike that case, their ethnic distributions may diﬀer. In panel b, all the
schools in Z have been combined into a single school; the resulting cluster is denoted c(Z).
Type II Independence states that this merger of schools does not aﬀect which combined
district is more segregated.
Type II Independence (IND2) Let X,Y, Z ∈ C be three districts such that T (X) =
T (Y ). Let c(Z) be the cluster that results from combining the schools in Z into a
single school. Then X ] Z < Y ] Z if and only if X ] c(Z) < Y ] c(Z).
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Amotivation is as follows. Suppose that, in panel a, the combination of X and Z is more
segregated than the combination of Y and Z. What must be driving this? Segregation
within cluster Z is the same in the two districts in panel a. So the combination of within-
X segregation and between-X-and-Z segregation must exceed the combination of within-Y
segregation and between-Y -and-Z segregation. Moreover, since X and Y are of the same
size, the relative importance of within-cluster and between-cluster segregation is the same in
the two cases. Now consider panel b. Merging the schools in Z does not aﬀect segregation
between this cluster and either X or Y . Consequently, if in panel b the district containing
cluster X is more segregated than the district containing cluster Y , then the combination
of within-X segregation and between-X-and-Z segregation must exceed the combination of
within-Y segregation and between-Y -and-Z segregation, just as in panel a. Moreover, since
the merger does not aﬀect the size of any cluster, it does not change the relative importance
of within-cluster and between-cluster segregation. Accordingly, merging the schools in Z
should not aﬀect which merged district is more segregated. In other words, the degree of
segregation within a given cluster should not aﬀect the relative importance of between-cluster
segregation and segregation within the other clusters in the district. In section 5 we show
that if an ordering violates Type II Independence, then an index that represents it cannot
be decomposable across schools in a particular simple way (Observation 1).
The next axiom is used to compare districts with diﬀerent ethnic distributions. It states
that segregation is invariant to the division of an existing ethnic group into two identically
distributed subgroups. For instance, if white students are divided into those with blue eyes
and those with brown, and these groups have the same distribution across schools, then the
segregation of a district should not change.
Group Division Property (GDP) Let X ∈ C be a district in which the set of ethnic
groups is G. Let X 0 be the result of partitioning some ethnic group g ∈G into two
ethnic groups, g1 and g2, such that both ethnic groups have the same distribution
across schools:
Tng1
Tg1
=
Tng2
Tg2
for all n ∈ N.12 Then X 0 ∼ X.
12Note that X 0 has the same set N of schools as X and for each school n ∈ N , Tng = Tng1 + Tng2 .
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A motivation is as follows. Suppose we partition the ethnic groups of X into K sets
or “supergroups.” Define within-supergroup segregation to be the segregation of the district
that would result if all students who are not members of the given supergroup were removed.
Let between-supergroup segregation be the segregation of the district that would result from
treating each supergroup as a single ethnic group. Then segregation in X should be a
function of segregation within each supergroup, segregation between the supergroups, and
the relative sizes of the supergroups.
This principle helps motivate GDP in the following way. Let us partition the ethnic
groups of X into two supergroups, one consisting of group g alone and the other consisting
of all other groups. Suppose group g is split into two groups, g1 and g2, which have the same
distribution across schools. This change clearly does not aﬀect segregation within either
supergroup, nor does it aﬀect segregation between the supergroups or the relative sizes of
the two supergroups. Hence, the district’s segregation ranking should not be aﬀected by
the split. In section 5 we show that an ordering that violates GDP cannot be represented
by an index that is decomposable over groups in a particular way (Observation 1).
The next axiom is a technical continuity property. We rely on this axiom to prove that
the segregation ordering is represented by a segregation index.
Continuity (C) Let X,Y,Z ∈ C be three districts. Then the sets
{c ∈ [0, 1] : cX ] (1− c)Y < Z} and {c ∈ [0, 1] : Z < cX ] (1− c)Y } are closed.
Our final axiom states that there exist two districts with two nonempty ethnic groups
that are not equally segregated. It is needed to rule out the trivial segregation ordering.
Nontriviality (N) There exist districts X,Y ∈ C, each with exactly 2 nonempty ethnic
groups, such that X Â Y .
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4 Results
The entropy of any discrete probability distribution q = (q1, . . . , qK) is defined by h(q) =PK
k=1 qk log2
³
1
qk
´
. (When p = 0, the term p log2(1/p) is assigned the value limp→0 [p log2(1/p)] =
0.) The Mutual Information index equals the entropy of the district’s ethnic distribution
minus the average entropy of the ethnic distributions of its schools:
M(X) = h(P )−
X
n∈N
P nh(pn)
where P = (Pg)g∈G is the district ethnic distribution and pn = (png )g∈G is the ethnic distrib-
ution of school n. If the ethnic group and school of a randomly selected student are thought
of as random variables eg and en, then the Mutual Information equals the mutual information
of these variables: the reduction in uncertainty about one variable that occurs when one
learns the value of the other (Cover and Thomas [15, pp. 18 ﬀ.]). Since mutual information
is a symmetric concept,13
Observation 1 the Mutual Information index is unchanged if the district matrix is trans-
posed (i.e., relabeling ethnic groups as schools and vice-versa).
Accordingly, the Mutual Information index captures the criteria of evenness and representa-
tiveness in a symmetric fashion. Also by symmetry, the Mutual Information index can be
interpreted both as the information that a student’s school conveys about her ethnicity, as
well as what her ethnicity tells us about her school.
Our main result is that the segregation ordering represented by the Mutual Information
index is the unique ordering that satisfies all of our axioms:
Theorem 1 The Mutual Information ordering is the only segregation ordering that satisfies
SYM, WSI, SDP, IND1, IND2, GDP, C, and N.
13See Cover and Thomas [15] for a survey of this and other properties of mutual information.
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The Mutual Information index is related to the more widely used Entropy segregation
index (Theil [53]; Theil and Finizza [54]), which is given by
H(X) = 1−
P
n∈N P
nh(pn)
h(P )
(2)
The Entropy index is the result of dividing the Mutual Information index by its maximum
value, the entropy h of the district ethnic distribution. Thus, the Entropy index takes a
maximum value of one, while the Mutual Information index has no maximum value. These
indices do not give the same segregation ordering. For instance, the Entropy index ranks all
districts with no ethnic mixing as equally segregated, while the Mutual Information index
assigns a higher segregation level to districts in which there is more initial uncertainty about
a student’s ethnicity.
Two examples illustrate this point. In the two districts h(1, 0, 0) , (0, 1, 0) , (0, 0, 1)i and
h(1, 0) , (0, 1)i, learning a student’s school uniquely determines her ethnicity. However, in
the first district, there initially is more uncertainty about the student’s ethnicity since there
are three equal-size groups instead of two. According to the Mutual Information index, the
first district is strictly more segregated (M = 1.6) than the second one (M = 1.0). The
Entropy index treats these districts as equally segregated, assigning both an index of 1.0.
A student’s ethnicity is determined by her school in the districts X = h(99, 0) , (0, 1)i and
Y = h(50, 0) , (0, 50)i as well. But in the second district there initially is more uncertainty
about a student’s ethnicity than in the first. According to the Mutual Information index, the
second district is more segregated (M = 1.0) than the first one (M = 0.08), these districts
both have an Entropy index of 1.0.
In the context of school segregation, are normalized indices desirable? Clotfelter [7]
argues not, on the grounds that they do not reflect changes in interracial contact well. To
illustrate his point, consider merging the two schools in district X or district Y , defined in
the prior paragraph. In district X, such a merger has a much smaller eﬀect on the interracial
exposure of the typical student, since 99% of students see only a 1% change in the percentage
of minorities. The eﬀects in Y are much greater, since 50% of each student’s schoolmates
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are now of the other racial group. While the Entropy index falls by the same amount, 1.0,
in both cases, the Mutual Information index falls by 0.08 in district X versus 1.0 in Y .
5 Other Indices
This section presents and analyzes other indices that have been used in the literature on
school segregation. In addition to our axioms, we also consider an additional property,
Scale Invariance, and two decomposability properties.
Scale Invariance states that the segregation of a district is invariant to proportional
changes in ethnic group size:14
Scale Invariance (SI) For any district X, ethnic group g ∈ G(X), and constant α > 0,
let X 0 be the result of multiplying the number of group-g students in each school n in
district X by α. Then X 0 ∼ X.
This property has both supporters and opponents in the field of school segregation (Taeuber
and James [50, p. 134]; Coleman, Hoﬀer, and Kilgore [10, p. 178]).
The next property states that, for any partition of a district’s schools into clusters, total
segregation in the district is the sum of between-cluster and within-cluster segregation (which
are defined in section 3):
Strong School Decomposability (SSD) An index S satisfies Strong School Decompos-
ability if, for any partition X = X1 ] · · · ] XK of the schools of a district into K
clusters,
S(X) = S(c(X1) ] · · · ] c(XK)) +
KX
k=1
P kS(Xk) (3)
where S(c(X1) ] · · · ] c(XK)) is segregation between the K clusters, S(Xk) is segre-
gation within cluster k, and P k is the proportion of students in cluster k.
14This property is also known as Compositional Invariance (e.g., James and Taeuber [32, pp. 15-16]).
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Mora and Ruiz-Castillo [39] show that the Mutual Information index satisfies SSD in
the case of two groups. SSD and weaker forms of separability have also been extensively
discussed in the literature of the measurement of income inequality. Bourguignon [4], for
instance, shows that a property analogous to SSD fully characterizes the Theil inequality
index (a close relative of the Mutual Information index) within the class of diﬀerentiable rel-
ative inequality indices. Foster [22] obtains a further characterization of the Theil inequality
index by replacing the diﬀerentiability requirement by a more appealing transfer principle.
Within the literature on the measurement of segregation, Hutchens [29] uses a weaker version
of separability to help characterize a segregation index that represents the ordering induced
by the Atkinson index (Atkinson [1]).
The second, analogous property states that, for any partition of a district’s groups
into sets or “supergroups”, total segregation is the sum of between-supergroup and within-
supergroup segregation (which are defined in section 3):
Strong Group Decomposability (SGD) An index S satisfies satisfies Strong Group De-
composability if, for any partition of the ethnic groups of a district X into K super-
groups,
S = SK +
KX
k=1
PkSk (4)
where SK is segregation between the K supergroups, Sk is the segregation within
supergroup k, and Pk is the proportion of students who are in supergroup k.
SSD and SGD have strong ordinal implications:
Proposition 1 If S is a segregation index that satisfies Strong School Decomposability, then
the segregation ordering represented by S satisfies IND1 and IND2. If S satisfies Strong
Group Decomposability, then the induced segregation ordering satisfies GDP.
A consequence is that if a segregation ordering does not satisfy GDP (respectively, either
IND1 or IND2), then it cannot be represented by an index that satisfies SGD (respectively,
SSD). The Mutual Information index is decomposable in both ways:
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Proposition 2 M satisfies SSD and SGD.
It is easy to verify that the Mutual Information index does not satisfy SI. In the following
claims, we state which of the ten properties SYM, WSI, SDP, IND1, IND2, GDP, C, N, SSD,
and SGD are violated by other indices in the school segregation literature. Where we say
that an index violates SSD or SGD, we also mean that the underlying ordering has no
alternative representation that satisfies the given property. The proofs are straightforward
and appear in an unpublished appendix (Frankel and Volij [21]). For proofs regarding SI, the
reader is referred to Reardon and Firebaugh [45]. If a property is not mentioned, the index
satisfies it.15 The notation I denotes the Simpson Iteraction Index, I =
P
g∈G Pg(1 − Pg)
(Lieberson [35]).
5.1 Index of Dissimilarity
The Multigroup Dissimilarity Index D of Morgan [42] and Sakoda [47], a generalization of
the 2-group index of Jahn, Schmid, and Schrag [30], is as follows:
D =
1
I
D0 where D0 =
1
2
X
g∈G
X
n∈N
P n
¯¯
png − Pg
¯¯
and
Intuitively, D0 equals the minimum proportion of the population that would have to change
schools, keeping school sizes fixed, in order for each school to be representative of the district.
I is what this proportion would be under complete segregation. Hence, the Multigroup
Dissimilarity Index, D, is a normalization of D0 that take a maximum value of 1.16 In the
two-group case, the formula for D simplifies to 1
2
P
n∈N
¯¯¯
Tn1
T1
− T
n
2
T2
¯¯¯
.
Claim 1 The multigroup dissimilarity index D satisfies all properties but IND1, IND2,
GDP, SSD, and SGD. It satisfies SI only in the two-group case.
15More precisely, the index satisfies the restriction of the property to cities with at least two nonempty
groups. Unlike the Mutual Information index, the indices in this section are not defined on the (albeit
uninteresting) set of cities that contain only one nonempty group.
16Some researchers (e.g., Watts [55], in the case of occupational gender segregation) have instead used the
unnormalized version, D0.
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5.2 Gini
The multigroup Gini index of Reardon [44], is a generalization of the two-group Gini index
of Jahn, Schmidt, and Schrag [30]:
G = 1
2I
X
g∈G
X
m∈N
X
n∈N
PmP n
¯¯
pmg − png
¯¯
Claim 2 The multigroup Gini index G satisfies all properties but IND1, IND2, GDP, SSD,
and SGD. It satisfies SI only in the two-group case.
5.3 Entropy Index
The Entropy index is defined in equation (2).
Claim 3 The Entropy index H satisfies all properties but IND2, GDP, SI, SSD, and SGD.
5.4 Normalized Exposure
The Normalized Exposure index was originally proposed by Bell [2] for the case of two groups.
Its multigroup version, formulated by James [31], is
P =
X
g∈G
X
n∈N
P n
(png − Pg)2
1− Pg
In the case of two groups (say whites and blacks, denoted 1 and 2, respectively), the index
equals P2−E
∗
P2
where E∗ = 1T1
P
n∈N T
n
1 pn2 is the “exposure”of whites to blacks: the proportion
black in the school attended by the average white student, and P2 (the proportion black in
the district) is the maximum value E∗ can take.17 Thus, the two-group index measures
the exposure of whites to blacks, normalized by the maximum possible such exposure. The
index is symmetric: it also measures the normalized exposure of blacks to whites.
17Proof available on request.
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Claim 4 The Normalized Exposure index P satisfies all properties but GDP, SI, IND2, SSD,
and SGD. It satisfies IND1 only in the two-group case.
5.5 Other Measures of School Segregation
Research that relies on the above indices includes Reardon and Yun [46] and Taeuber and
James [50], both of whom use D, G, and H, and Zoloth [56], who uses D, P , and H. In
addition, P is used by Coleman, Kelly, and Moore [11] and Coleman, Hoﬀer, and Kilgore [10].
Other research on school segregation relies on diﬀerent measures. One is the percentage of
blacks or nonwhites who attend schools in which at least some proportion κ of students are
nonwhite. If we simplify by assuming two groups, whites (group 1) and blacks (group 2),
this index can be written
Cl(X) =
1
T2
X
n∈N(X):pn2≥κ
Tn2 (5)
This measure is also used by Clotfelter [8] (who also uses P , D, and G), Clotfelter, Ladd,
and Vigdor [9] (who also use P ) and Boozer, Krueger, and Wolkon [3].
Claim 5 The index Cl violates SYM, SDP, IND2, SI, and SSD. It satisfies WSI, N, IND1,
and C.
There is ambiguity regarding how to generalize Cl to an arbitrary number of groups, so we
cannot say whether it satisfies GDP or SGD.
Card and Rothstein [5] compute the average fraction black or Hispanic in the schools
attended by the typical black and white student, and define segregation as the diﬀerence
between these figures. Letting whites, blacks, and Hispanics be indexed by 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, this index equals
CR(X) =
X
n∈N(X)
µ
Tn2
T2
− T
n
1
T1
¶
Tn2 + T n3
T n
Claim 6 The index CR violates SYM, SDP, IND1, IND2, SI, and SSD. It satisfies WSI,
N, and C.
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Since CR is defined for three particular groups, GDP and SGD cannot be evaluated.
5.6 Summary of Results
The results of this section are summarized in the following table. A check mark indicates
that the property is satisfied; “×” indicates that it is violated.
Index SYM WSI SDP IND1 IND2 GDP C N SI SSD SGD
Modified Entropy X X X X X X X X × X X
Entropy X X X X × × X X × × ×
Dissimilarity X X X × × × X X 2 × ×
Gini X X X × × × X X 2 × ×
Normalized Exposure X X X 2 × × X X × × ×
Cl × X × X × N/A X X × × N/A
CR × X × × × N/A X X × × N/A
Table 2: Properties of School Segregation Indices. A check mark indicates that the property is satisfied
by the index. An “×” indicates that it is not. “2”indicates that it is satisfied only in the 2-group case. The
properties are Symmetry (SYM), Weak Scale Invariance (WSI), the School Division Property (SDP), Type
I Independence (IND1), Type II Independence (IND2), the Group Division Property (GDP), Continuity
(C), Nontriviality (N), Scale Invariance (SI), Strong School Decomposability (SSD), and Strong Group
Decomposability (SGD).
6 Related Literature
The first to study segregation axiomatically was Philipson [43], who provides an axiomatic
characterization of a large family of segregation orderings that have an additively separable
representation. The representation consists of a weighted average of a function that depends
on the school’s ethnic distribution only.
In two papers, Hutchens [28, 29] studies the measurement of segregation in the case of two
ethnic groups. Hutchens [28] characterizes the family of indices that satisfy a set of mostly
cardinal properties. Hutchens [29] strengthens one axiom and obtains a unique segregation
index, which is based on the Atkinson inequality index [1]. Both of these papers assume
Scale Invariance.
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Echenique and Fryer [18] use data on individuals’ social networks to measure the strength
of an individual’s isolation from members of other ethnic groups. They rely on cardinal
axioms and require data on social networks, while our measure relies only on ordinal axioms
and uses data on the numbers of students in each ethnic group and school.
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We first show that the ordering represented by the Mutual Informa-
tion index satisfies the axioms. Axioms N, SYM, and WSI are trivial, and C follows from
the fact that the index M is a continuous function of the T ng ’s (the number of students of
each group in each school). Axioms IND1, IND2,and GDP follow from Propositions 1 and
2. So it remains to show that SDP is satisfied. Let X ∈ C be a district and let n be a school
of X. Let X 0 be the district that results from dividing n into two schools, n1 and n2. Since
X and X 0 have the same group distribution,
M(X 0)−M(X) = Pnh((png )g∈G(X))− P n1h((pn1g )g∈G(X))− P n2h((pn2g )g∈G(X))
= Pn
µ
h((png )g∈G(X))−
P n1
P n
h((pn1g )g∈G(X))−
P n2
P n
h((pn2g )g∈G(X))
¶
But for all g, png =
Pn1
Pn p
n1
g +
Pn2
Pn p
n2
g so, recalling that h((qg)g∈G) =
P
g∈G qg log2(
1
qg
) is a
concave function, M(X 0)−M(X) ≥ 0, with strict inequality only if schools n1 and n2 have
diﬀerent group distributions. This verifies SDP.
We now show that the Mutual Information ordering is the only segregation ordering that
satisfies all the axioms. Let < be a segregation ordering that satisfies them. For any district
X, let the schools be numbered n = 1, . . . , N and the groups g = 1, . . . , G.
For any group distribution P = (Pg)
G
g=1, let X(P ) denote the district, with population 1,
with group distribution P , and with G uniracial schools, and let X(P ) denote the one-school
district with group distribution P and population 1:
X(P ) = h(P1, 0, ..., 0), ...(0, ..., 0, PG)i and X(P ) = h(P1, ..., PG)i .
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For any integerG ≥ 1, letXG = h(1/G, 0, ..., 0) , ..., (0, ..., 0, 1/G)i denote the completely seg-
regated district of population 1 with G equal sized ethnic groups. LetXG = h(1/G, ..., 1/G)i
denote the one-school district with the same group distribution and population.
We first state and prove some preliminary lemmas. By applying IND1 repeatedly, one
can show the following apparently stronger (but actually equivalent) property, which will be
used interchangeably with IND1.
Lemma 1 Suppose the segregation ordering < satisfies IND1. Let X,Y ∈ C be two districts
with equal populations and equal group distributions. Then for all districts Z ∈ C containing
any number of schools, X < Y if and only if X ] Z < Y ] Z.
Proof. Let the schools of Z be enumerated: n1, ..., nN . By IND1, X < Y if and only if
X ] hn1i < Y ] hn1i, where hn1i denotes a district that consists of school n1 alone. The
districts X 0 = X ] hn1i and Y 0 = Y ] hn1i have the same size and group distribution since
X and Y do. Hence, by IND1, X 0 < Y 0 if and only if X 0 ] hn2i < Y 0 ] hn2i. The result
follows by repeating the same argument for schools n3, ..., nN . Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 1. All districts in which every school is representative have the same degree
of segregation under <.
2. Any district in which every school is representative is weakly less segregated under <
than any district in which some school is unrepresentative.
Proof.
1. Consider any district Y that consists of N representative schools. By WSI we can
assume w.l.o.g. that T (Y ) = 1. For each i = 1, ..., N , let Yi be the school district
consisting of schools i+ 1 through N of Y as well as a single school that contains the
students in schools 1 through i of Y . By SDP, for each i = 1, ..., N − 1, Yi ∼ Yi+1.
Hence, by transitivity, Y = Y1 ∼ YN . YN contains a single school. By GDP, YN ∼ X1,
and hence Y ∼ X1.
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2. Consider any district Y in which at least one school is unrepresentative. The above
procedure yields Y = Y1 < Y2 < · · · < YN ∼ X1. By transitivity, Y < X1.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 For any district Z with G ethnic groups, let σ(Z) ∈ C be such that the number
of persons of ethnic group g in school n in Z equals the number of persons of ethnic group
(g + 1)modG in school n in σ(Z). Define σ1(Z) = σ(Z) and, for integers j > 1, let
σj(Z) = σ(σj−1(Z)).18 Then 1G
UG
j=1 σ
j(Z) < Z.
Proof. Consider the following statement:
³Un
j=1 Z
´
]
³UG
j=n+1 c(Z)
´
4
³Un
j=1 σ
j(Z)
´
]
³UG
j=n+1 σ
j(c(Z))
´
(6)
For n = 0, (6) simply states
UG
j=1 c(Z) 4
³UG
j=1 σ
j(c(Z))
´
, which holds by Lemma 2.
Assume that (6) holds for some n = k, with 0 ≤ k < G− 1. Then, taking into account that
σG is the identity permutation,
³Un
j=1 Z
´
]
³UG
j=n+2 c(Z)
´
] c(Z) 4
³Un
j=1 σ
j(Z)
´
]
³UG−1
j=n+1 σ
j(c(Z))
´
] c(Z)
=⇒
³Un
j=1 Z
´
]
³UG
j=n+2 c(Z)
´
] Z 4
³Un
j=1 σ
j(Z)
´
]
³UG−1
j=n+1 σ
j(c(Z))
´
] Z by IND2
∼ σ
³³Un
j=1 σ
j(Z)
´
]
³UG−1
j=n+1 σ
j(c(Z))
´
] Z
´
by SYM
∼
³Un+1
j=2 σ
j(Z)
´
]
³UG
j=n+2 σ
j(c(Z))
´
] σ(Z) by def. of σ³Un+1
j=1 Z
´
]
³UG
j=n+2 c(Z)
´
4
³Un+1
j=1 σ
j(Z)
´
]
³UG
j=n+2 σ
j(c(Z))
´
That is, (6) also holds for n = k + 1. By induction it also holds for n = G − 1. That is,UG
j=1 Z 4
UG
j=1 σ
j(Z) which, by SDP and WSI implies Z 4 1G
UG
j=1 σ
j(Z). Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 For any district X with G groups and group distribution P , X
G < X(P ) < X.
18Note that σG(Z) = Z.
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Proof. By WSI, w.l.o.g. we can assume that T (X) = 1 . X can be converted into a
completely segregated district by dividing each school n into G distinct schools, each of
which includes all and only the members of a single ethnic group. By SDP, this procedure
results in a weakly more segregated district. By then combining all schools containing a
given ethnic group, this can be converted to X(P ) without changing the segregation level
(by SDP). To see that X
G < X, note that by Lemma 3, 1G
UG
j=1 σ
j(X(P )) < X(P ). But
by SDP, the left hand side district is as segregated as X
G
. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 For any integer G ≥ 1, XG 4 XG+1.
Proof. Let X be the (G+ 1)-group district that results after splitting one ethnic group in
X
G
up into two equally distributed subgroups. By Lemma 4 and GDP, X
G+1 < X ∼ XG.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6 Let X and X 0 be two districts with the same size and group distribution such that
X Â X 0. Let 1 ≥ α > β ≥ 0. Then αX ] (1− α)X 0 Â βX ] (1− β)X 0
Proof. By WSI, (α − β)X Â (α − β)X 0. Since X and X 0 have the same size and group
distribution, so do (α− β)X and (α− β)X 0. So by IND1,
βX ] (α− β)X ] (1− α)X 0 Â βX ] (α− β)X 0 ] (1− α)X 0.
By SDP, αX ] (1− α)X 0 Â βX ] (1− β)X 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 7 For any districts Z < X < Y such that Z Â Y and Y and Z have the same size
and group distribution, there is a unique α ∈ [0, 1] such that X ∼ αZ ] (1− α)Y .
Proof. The sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : αZ ] (1− α)Y < X} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : X < αZ ] (1− α)Y }
are closed by C. Any α satisfies X ∼ αZ ] (1−α)Y if and only if it is in the intersection of
these two sets. Given that Z < X < Y , these sets are each nonempty. Their union is the
whole unit interval since < is complete. Since the interval [0, 1] is connected, the intersection
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of the two sets must be nonempty. By Lemma 6, their intersection cannot contain more
than one element. Thus, their intersection contains a single element α. Q.E.D.
Let X be a district with G groups and group distribution bP = ( bP1, ..., bPG). For any
G0 ≥ 1 and any distribution P = (P1, ..., PG0) let φP (X) be the district that results after
splitting each ethnic group g in district X into G0 ethnic groups in proportions given by P .
That is, the Tng members of each ethnic group g in each school n of X are split up into G0
ethnic groups of size P1Tng , ..., PG0Tng . The resulting district φ
P (X) has GG0 groups with
distribution
³
( bPgPg0)Gg=1´G0
g0=1
.
Let X be a district and let bP = ( bP1, ..., bPG) be an arbitrary distribution such that
X( bP ) < X and X( bP ) < X2. By lemmas 4 and 5 such a distribution exists. By Nontriviality,
Lemma 4, and Lemma 2, X
2 Â X2 ∼ X( bP ). Therefore, by Lemma 7 there is a unique bα
such that
X ∼ bαX( bP ) ] (1− bα)X( bP ). (7)
Similarly, by Lemma 7 there is a unique bβ such that X2 ∼ bβX( bP )](1−bβ)X( bP ). By Lemma
6, bβ > 0, as X( bP ) < X2.
Define the index S : C → R by
S(X) = bα/bβ (8)
For S to be well defined, bα/bβ cannot depend on the particular choice of bP . We now verify
this. Consider another distribution eP = ( eP1, ..., ePG0) such that X( eP ) < X and X( eP ) < X2
and let eα and eβ the unique numbers such that X ∼ eαX( eP ) ] (1 − eα)X( eP ) and X2 ∼eβX( eP ) ] (1− eβ)X( eP ). By GDP
X ∼ φ eP
³eαX( eP ) ] (1− eα)X( eP )´ ∼ eαφ eP ³X( eP )´ ] (1− eα)φ eP ³X( eP )´ (9)
Similarly, applying the transformation φ hP to (7) and using GDP,
X ∼ bαφ hP ³X( bP )´ ] (1− bα)φ hP ³X( bP )´ (10)
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Both φ hP
³
X( bP )´ and φ eP ³X( eP )´ are districts with the same number of groups (G ∗ G0)
and (up to a permutation) the same group distribution. Further by SYM, φ hP
³
X( bP )´ ∼
φ eP
³
X( eP )´. Similarly, both φ hP ³X( bP )´ and φ eP ³X( eP )´ are districts with the same number
of groups and (up to a permutation) the same group distribution. Assume w.l.o.g. that
φ eP
³
X( eP )´ < φ hP ³X( bP )´ and let γ be the unique number such that
φ hP
³
X( bP )´ ∼ γφ eP ³X( eP )´ ] (1− γ)φ eP ³X( eP )´
Then, applying WSI, IND1 (twice) and SDP, it follows from (10) that
X ∼ bα hγφ eP ³X( eP )´ ] (1− γ)φ eP ³X( eP )´i ] (1− bα)φ eP ³X( eP )´
∼ bαγφ eP ³X( eP )´ ] (1− γbα)φ eP ³X( eP )´ (11)
Comparing (11) and (9) we obtain that eα = bαγ. Exactly the same reasoning leads to eβ = bβγ.
Consequently bα/bβ = eα/eβ. This establishes that S is well-defined.
Lemma 8 The index S defined in (8) represents <.
Proof. Let X,Y ∈ C and let G be at least as large as the number of groups in X or Y .
Then, by lemmas 4 and 5, X
G < X2, XG < X and XG < Y . Define αX , αY and β by
X ∼ αXX
G ] (1− αX)XG
Y ∼ αYX
G ] (1− αY )XG
X
2 ∼ βXG ] (1− β)XG.
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Then,
X < Y ⇐⇒ αXX
G ] (1− αX)XG < αYXG ] (1− αY )XG by definition of αX and αY
⇐⇒ αX ≥ αY by Lemma 6
⇐⇒ αX/β ≥ αY /β since β > 0
⇐⇒ S(X) ≥ S(Y ) by definition of S
Q.E.D.
The following results will be used to show that S is the Mutual Information index.
Lemma 9 For any group distribution P = (P1, ..., PG) (in which some entries may be zero),
let bP = ¡P1G , ..., P1G , ..., PGG , ..., PGG ¢ be the group distribution that results from dividing each
ethnic group in P into G equal sized groups. Then X( bP ) < XG and X( bP ) < X(P ).
Proof. For the first claim, first subdivide each ethnic group in X
G
into G groups in propor-
tions given by P . For instance, the first group is divided into G groups of sizes P1 1G , ..., PG
1
G .
Now put each resulting group in a separate school. The group distribution of the resulting
district,
¡
P1 1G , ..., PG
1
G , ..., P1
1
G , ..., PG
1
G
¢
, is just a permutation of bP . Hence, by GDP and
SDP,X( bP ) < XG. The second claim follows from the first one after noting that by Lemma 4,
X
G < X(P ). Q.E.D.
Lemma 10 Let districts Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4 all have the same population and group distri-
bution and let Z1 ∼ Z2 and Z3 ∼ Z4. Let Z5, Z6 be two districts with equal populations.
Then Z1 ] Z5 ∼ Z2 ] Z6 if and only if Z3 ] Z5 ∼ Z4 ] Z6 .
Proof. By IND2 applied twice, Z1 ] Z5 ∼ Z1 ] Z6 if and only if Z3 ] Z5 ∼ Z3 ] Z6. But
by IND1, Z1 ] Z6 ∼ Z2 ] Z6 and Z3 ] Z6 ∼ Z4 ] Z6. Q.E.D.
Lemma 11 For any districts X and Y , S(X ] Y ) = S(c(X) ] Y ) + T (X)T (X)+T (Y )S(X).
Proof. Let X and Y be any two districts. Let X ] Y have G ethnic groups. By
adding an empty group if needed, we can assume WLOG that G ≥ 2. For any district
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Z, let φG(Z) be the result of splitting each group g in Z into G equal-size groups, each of
which has the same school distribution as g. Let bP be the group distribution of φG(X).
By Lemma 9, X( bP ) < XG. Define bαX by X ∼ bαXX( bP ) ] (1 − bαX)X( bP ) and γ by
c(X) ] Y ∼ γX( bP ) ] (1− γ)X( bP ). Define
Z1 = φG(X)
Z2 = T (X)
³bαXX( bP ) ] (1− bαX)X( bP )´
Z3 = c(φG(X)) = φG(c(X))
Z4 = T (X)X( bP )
Z5 = φG(Y )
Z6 = T (X ] Y )
µ
γX( bP ) ]µ1− T (X)
T (X ] Y ) − γ
¶
X( bP )¶
To show that Z6 is well defined, we must show that γ ≤ 1− T (X)T (X]Y ) =
T (Y )
T (X]Y ) . For this, by
Lemma 6, it is enough to show that
γX( bP ) ] (1− γ)X( bP ) 4 T (Y )
T (X ] Y )X(
bP ) ] T (X)
T (X ] Y )X(
bP ). (12)
The district c(X) ] Y has G groups since X ] Y does. By Lemma 3,
c(X) ] Y 4 1
G
UG
j=1 σ
j(c(X) ] Y ) = 1
G
UG
j=1 σ
j(c(X)) ] 1
G
UG
j=1 σ
j(Y )
Let ]c(X) = 1G
UG
j=1 σ
j(c(X)) and Y˜ = 1G
UG
j=1 σ
j(Y ). Each of ]c(X) and Y˜ has G groups of
equal size. By SDP,]c(X) ∼ T (X)XG and both of these districts have the same population,
T (X), and the same group distribution. Since Y˜ has G equal size groups, it is not more
segregated than T (Y )X
G
and both of these districts have the same population, T (Y ), and
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the same group distribution. Therefore,
c(X) ] Y 4 T (X)XG ] T (Y )XG by IND1 (twice)
∼ φG
³
T (X)XG ] T (Y )XG
´
by GDP
∼ T (X)φG
¡
XG
¢ ] T (Y )φG ³XG´ by definition of φG
4 T (X)X( bP ) ] T (Y )X( bP ) by SDP
∼ T (X)T (X]Y )X( bP ) ] T (Y )T (X]Y )X( bP ) by WSI
But c(X) ] Y ∼ γX( bP ) ] (1− γ)X( bP ) so (12) holds and γ ≤ T (Y )T (X]Y ) , as claimed.
By construction, Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4 all have the same population and group distribution.
By GDP, Z1 ∼ Z2. Clearly, Z3 ∼ Z4 since these are actually the same district. Also, the
population of Z6 is T (Y ), which equals the population of Z5. Moreover,
Z4 ] Z6 = T (X)X( bP ) ] T (X ] Y )³γX( bP ) ] ³1− T (X)T (X]Y ) − γ´X( bP )´
= T (X ] Y )
³
γX( bP ) ] (1− γ)X( bP )´ by SDP
∼ c(X) ] Y by WSI
∼ φG(c(X)) ] φG(Y ) by GDP
= Z3 ] Z5
So by Lemma 10,
Z1 ] Z5 ∼ Z2 ] Z6 (13)
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Now,
X ] Y ∼ φG(X ] Y ) by GDP
= Z1 ] Z5
∼ Z2 ] Z6 by (13)
= T (X)
³bαXX( bP ) ] (1− bαX)X( bP )´
]T (X ] Y )
µ
γX( bP ) ]µ1− T (X)
T (X ] Y ) − γ
¶
X( bP )¶
∼ (T (X ] Y )γ + T (X)bαX)X( bP ) ] T (X ] Y )µ1− γ − T (X)T (X ] Y )bαX
¶
X( bP ) by SDP
∼
µ
γ +
T (X)
T (X ] Y )bαX
¶
X( bP ) ]µ1− γ − T (X)
T (X ] Y )bαX
¶
X( bP ) by WSI.
We have shown that X ] Y ∼
³
γ + T (X)T (X]Y )bαX´X( bP ) ] ³1− γ − T (X)T (X]Y )bαX´X( bP ). By
definition of γ and bαX , c(X)]Y ∼ γX( bP )](1−γ)X( bP ) and X ∼ bαXX( bP )](1−bαX)X( bP ).
By Lemma 7, there is a unique β such that X
2 ∼ βX( bP ) ] (1− β)X( bP ). By definition of
S, S(X ] Y ) = 1β
³
γ + TT+T (Y )bαX´ = S(c(X) ] Y ) + TT+T (Y )S(X), as claimed. Q.E.D.
For any discrete probability distribution P = (P1, ..., PG), define the function s(P ) to
equal S(X(P )).
Claim 7 The function s is the entropy function. Namely, s(P ) = h(P ) =
Pn
i=1 Pi log2
1
Pi
.
Proof. It is known that the entropy function is the only function that satisfies the following
three properties.19
1. h(1/2, 1/2) = 1.
2. h(p, 1− p) is continuous in p.
3. h(p1, ..., pn) = h(p1 + p2, p3, ..., pn) + (p1 + p2)h
³
p1
p1+p2
, p2p1+p2
´
.
19The statement of this result appears as an exercise in Cover and Thomas [15]. For the original proof,
see Faddeev [19].
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So it is enough to show that s satisfies them. Property 1 follows from the definition of S and
the fact that S(X(1/2, 1/2)) = S(X
2
). Property 3 follows from Lemma 11. It remains to
show property 2. Let us write X(p, 1− p) as Zp for brevity. By Lemma 7, there is a unique
αp such that Zp ∼ αpX
2 ] (1− αp)X2. By definition of S, αp = S(X(p, 1− p)). For all p,
the sets {q : Zq < Zp} and {q : Zq 4 Zp} are closed by Continuity. Note that Zq < Zp if
and only if αq ≥ αp by Lemma 6. So the sets {q : αq ≥ αp} and {q : αq ≤ αp} are closed. If
αp is not a continuous function of p, then let the sequence (pk)∞k=1 converge to some p. By
restricting to an appropriate subsequence, we may assume that limk→∞ αpk exists. Let this
limit be c and assume by contradiction that c 6= αp. Assume that c > αp (the other case is
analogous). Since limk→∞ αpk = c >
c+αp
2
, there is a k∗ such that αpk >
c+αp
2
for all k > k∗.
So the sequence {pk : k > k∗} lies in
©
q : αq ≥ c+αp2
ª
. But limk→∞ pk = p does not lie in
this set, which contradicts the fact that this set is closed. Q.E.D.
We now show that S is the Mutual Information index. Consider any district X with N
schools, G ethnic groups, and group distribution P . Let X0 = X. Let Xn be the result
of separating the students in each school m ≤ n into G uniracial schools. For instance, if
X = h(1, 2) , (3, 4)i, then X1 = h(1, 0) , (0, 2) , (3, 4)i and X2 = h(1, 0) , (0, 2) , (3, 0) , (0, 4)i.
Note that XN is completely segregated and has group distribution P , so XN ∼ X(P ). By
Lemma 11,
S(Xn) = S(Xn−1) + P nS(X(pn)) for n = 1, ..., N.
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Thus,
S(XN) = S(X) +
NX
n=1
P nS(X(pn))
=⇒ S(X) = S(XN)−
NX
n=1
P nS(X(pn))
= S(X(P ))−
NX
n=1
P nS(X(pn))
=
GX
g=1
Pg log2
1
Pg
−
NX
n=1
P n
GX
g=1
png log2
1
png
.
where the last line follows from Claim 7. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: IND1: Let X and Y have the same size and group distribution,
and let Z be another district. Then c(X) = c(Y ) and T (X)/T (X]Z) = T (Y )/T (Y ]Z) = p.
Then, applying SSD, M (X ] Z) ≥M (Y ] Z) if and only if
M (c(X) ] c(Z)) + pM(X) + (1− p)M(Z) ≥ M (c(Y ) ] c(Z)) + pM(Y ) + (1− p)M(Z)
⇔ M(X) ≥M(Y )
IND2: LetW,X, Y ∈ C be three districts such that T (W ) = T (X). Then, T (W )/T (W]Y ) =
T (X)/T (X ] Y ) = p. Now, applying SSD,
M(W ] c(Y )) ≥M(X ] c(Y ))⇔M(c(W ) ] c(Y )) + pM(W ) ≥M(c(X) ] c(Y )) + pM(X)
⇔ M(c(W ) ] c(Y )) + pM(W ) + (1− p)M(Y ) ≥M(c(X) ] c(Y )) + pM(X) + (1− p)M(Y )
⇔ M(W ] Y ) ≥M(X ] Y )
The proof of GDP is similar and is left to the reader. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let X = X1 ] · · · ]XK be district composed of K clusters. By
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definition of M ,
M(X) = h(P (X))−
KX
k=1
X
n∈N(Xk)
P nh(pn)
Subtracting and adding
PK
k=1 P
kh(P (Xk)) on the right hand side, we obtain
M(X) = h(P (X))−
KX
k=1
P kh(P (Xk)) +
KX
k=1
P kh(P (Xk))−
KX
k=1
X
n∈N(Xk)
P nh(pn)
= h(P (X))−
KX
k=1
P kh(P (Xk)) +
KX
k=1
P k
⎛
⎝h(P (Xk))−
X
n∈N(Xk)
P nh(pn)
⎞
⎠
= M(c(X1) ] · · · ] c(XK)) +
KX
k=1
P kM(Xk).
This shows thatM satisfies SSD. ThatM satisfies SGD as well now follows from Observation
1. Q.E.D.
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